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A
mAbstract
Using linked employer–employee panel data for West Germany that include direct
information on the competition faced by plants, we investigate the effect of product
market competition on the gender pay gap. Controlling for match fixed effects, we
find that intensified competition significantly lowers the unexplained gap in plants
with neither collective agreements nor a works council. Conversely, there is no effect
in plants with these types of worker codetermination, which are unlikely to have
enough discretion to adjust wages in the short run. We also document a larger
competition effect in plants with few females in their workforces. Our findings are in
line with Beckerian taste-based employer wage discrimination that is limited by
competitive forces.
JEL codes: J16, J31, J71
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1 Introduction
Studies documenting a significant, persistent gender pay gap are legion, as are studies
relating this gap to wage discrimination in the labour market1. The usual theoretical
approach to wage discrimination originates in the pathbreaking work by Becker (1971).
According to Becker, discrimination stems from personal prejudices among employers,
co-workers, or consumers that constitute discriminatory preferences among these
groups. As a case in point, discriminatory employers may suffer a disutility from
employing women. To be compensated for the loss in utility following from employing
women, these employers pay lower wages to women than to men, ceteris paribus. In
the non-segregating equilibrium, all female workers receive a lower wage than men, no
matter whether they work for an employer with or without discriminatory preferences.
Yet, as pointed out by Arrow (1973), in equilibrium, non-discriminatory employers
employ more women at below-productivity wages than their discriminatory counter-
parts and therefore gain a competitive advantage over their competitors. Put differ-
ently, indulging discriminatory preferences comes at a cost in this framework. Indeed,
empirical studies have documented that discriminatory employers make lower profits
(Hellerstein et al. 2002; Kawaguchi 2007) and are more likely to exit the market
(Weber and Zulehner 2014). Employers actually seem to pay for discrimination.
For discrimination to prevail, discriminatory employers must possess some market
power on their product markets, enabling them to indulge their costly preferences.
Otherwise, discrimination would simply be competed away. And thus, the strength of2014 Hirsch et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
edium, provided the original work is properly credited.
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gender pay gaps being lower in more competitive environments. Following this line of
reasoning, we investigate whether strong product market competition reduces gender
wage discrimination in West Germany and whether this effect is more pronounced in
the so-called codetermination-free sector, i.e., in plants with neither collective agree-
ments nor a works council. In contrast with previous studies, we use linked employer–
employee panel data that include a plant-level assessment of the strength of product
market competition.
Almost exclusively, extant studies have used aggregate or indirect measures of com-
petition such as the intensity of international trade (Black and Brainerd 2004; Juhn
et al. 2014), the extent of market regulation (Black and Strahan 2001), market structure
(Winter-Ebmer 1995; Heyman et al. 2013), or combinations of these (Jirjahn and
Stephan 2006; Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer 2007; Zweimüller et al. 2008;
Heinze and Wolf 2010). Such measures, however, suffer from at least two severe short-
comings: First, although these proxies may be informative on the average intensity of
product market competition within a product market, they do not provide information
on changes in competitive pressure at the level of the individual firm where decision-
making takes place. Even worse, using these measures requires the researcher to im-
plicitly define plants’ relevant product and geographical markets, which turns out to
be far from trivial. Notably, the inevitable problems in doing so in a convincing
and unambiguous way drove the German Monopolies Commission to cease reporting
classic concentration measures, like the Herfindahl index or the concentration ratio,
altogether (Monopolies Commission 2012, p. 12). Second, through the lens of the
structure–conduct–performance paradigm, utilising these measures also claims that the
market structure uniquely determines market participants’ behaviour, thereby abstract-
ing from different ways of competition on different product markets that may add fur-
ther ambiguity to the proxy at hand. As a case in point, Sutton (1991) shows that fierce
competition on a market with substantial entry costs may lead to high concentration in
an industry (the limiting case being two incumbents competing à la Bertrand). To
sidestep these problems related to aggregate or indirect proxies of product market
competition, we will use a direct plant-level measure of competitive pressure based on
a self-assessment by plants’ managers. Therefore, we do not have to define plants’ rele-
vant market ex ante, and basing our measure on the beliefs of plants’ managers about
competition guarantees that it is relevant for managements’ decision-making.
To the best of our knowledge, Belfield and Heywood (2006) and Hirsch et al. (2012)
are the only scholars in this strand of the literature to base their evidence on direct
information on the competition faced by individual firms. While Hirsch et al. (2012)
find a negative correlation between firms’ self-assessment on product market competition
and the unexplained gender pay gap in West Germany, Belfield and Heywood (2006)
document a negative link for the U.K. that is more pronounced in the non-unionised
sector. Both studies, however, rely on cross-sectional data only – with Hirsch et al. (2012)
utilising the 2008 cross section of the data set used in this study. They thus cannot
rule out that differences in pay gaps, reflecting unobserved heterogeneity among
firms facing different levels of product market competition and/or self-selection of
workers into firms with different competitive pressure rather than a genuine
competition effect.
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our panel data permit us to investigate the impact of plant-level product market com-
petition on the unexplained gender pay gap, controlling for match fixed effects, i.e.,
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity for every plant–worker pair. We thus base
our investigation on direct information on the competition faced by plants, with identi-
fication relying on the differential impact of within-plant variation in competitive pres-
sure on within-plant wage growth of men and women. As a consequence, estimated
effects are neither contaminated by unobserved time-invariant plant heterogeneity nor
by self-selection of workers.
Second, apart from identification, we add to the literature by investigating hetero-
geneities in the competition effect on gender wage discrimination by plants’ industrial
relations regime. German industrial relations are characterised by a dual system of wor-
ker representation through (sectoral) trade unions and works councils that can be
elected by the workforce in plants with at least five employees (for details, see Keller
2004 or Addison 2009). As plants’ discretion to alter wages in response to changes in
competitive pressure should be more limited if they are bound by a collective agree-
ment or if they have a works council, we analyse whether the competition effect is
stronger in the sector with none of these types of worker representation (which in
Germany is usually referred to as the codetermination-free sector).
Third, we investigate whether the effect is larger in plants with a below-average
share of females in their workforces. Since theory suggests that these plants have
more pronounced discriminatory preferences, a stronger competition effect in these
plants would further substantiate that fierce competition limits taste-based employer
discrimination.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes our data set
and Section 3 our econometric approach. Section 4 presents and discusses our results,
and Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
The data used in this paper consist of three waves of the cross-sectional model of the
linked employer–employee data set of the Institute for Employment Research (LIAB)
for the years 2008–2010 (for details, see Alda et al. 2005 and Heining et al. 2013). The
data set links the IAB Establishment Panel, a representative survey of German plants
(not companies), to the administrative data on all those individuals who work for these
plants and contribute to the social insurance system.
The administrative data are based on the notification procedure for the German
health, pension, and unemployment insurances. This requires all employers to report
the necessary information on their workers if covered by the system, where misreport-
ing is legally prohibited. Thus, among others, civil servants, self-employed, and individ-
uals in marginal employment are not included. All in all, about 80 per cent of all
people employed in Germany are covered by the social security system. Inter alia, the
data include information for every worker on the daily gross wage, age, education, sex,
nationality, tenure, occupation, and industry at the 30th of June of each year.
The employer side of our data comes from the IAB Establishment Panel (for details,
see Kölling 2000), a stratified random sample of all plants that employ at least one
worker covered by the social security system at the 30th June of each year. Starting in
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Germany. Response rates of units that have been interviewed repeatedly exceed 80 per
cent. Questions deal, among other things, with the number of workers, the composition
of the workforce, the plant’s commitment to collective agreements at the sector or
plant level, the existence of a works council, the plant’s exporting activity, and its
production technology.
From 2008 onwards, the data additionally include a plant-level self-assessment of
product market competition on a four-point Likert scale that enables us to distinguish
plants facing strong competition from other plants2. Using this information, we set up
a panel data set for West Germany in the years 2008–2010 to investigate the effect of
product market competition on the gender pay gap in profit-oriented plants3.
Whereas the wage information included in the LIAB is highly reliable, there are two
shortcomings of the data crucial to our investigation: Firstly, the data set includes daily
wages only and no detailed information on working hours. As a consequence, we have
to exclude part-time workers. Secondly, wages are top-coded at the social security con-
tribution ceiling, which affects 16.2 per cent of our male and 6.0 per cent of our female
observations. To deal with this second issue, we apply the standard single imputation
procedure proposed by Gartner (2005) and impute top-coded wages. In a first step, we
estimate yearly Tobit models for each combination of sex and competition (e.g., females
working for plants facing strong competition), where the regressand is the log daily
gross wage and the regressors are those included in the subsequent analysis. In a
second step, for every observation with a top-coded wage, a random value is drawn
from a normal distribution left-truncated at the respective social security contribution
ceiling, with the predicted log wage as mean and the standard deviation as estimated
from the Tobit models4.
All in all, we end up with a sample of 1,239,911 observations of 627,076 male workers
and 305,876 observations of 166,759 female workers employed by 6,114 plants. As can
be seen from Table 1, 66 per cent of male and 61 per cent of female observations
belong to plants facing strong product market competition. Furthermore, 6 per cent of
male and 10 per cent of female observations are in the codetermination-free sector, i.e.,
work in plants that are neither bound by collective agreements nor have a works
council. Turning to wages, women earn about 21 per cent lower wages than men on
average. This number hardly changes when considering the subgroups of workers
working for plants facing strong or weak competition, though workers’ wages are
generally higher in plants with strong competitive pressure5. (For more descriptive
statistics, see Table 2.)
As the transition matrix in Table 3 makes clear, plants’ self-assessment on product
market competition is extensively varied over time. During our period of observation,
1,715 transitions between strong and weak competition take place compared to 5,077
instances where competition stays constant. As a consequence, 23 per cent, or 171,369
out of 751,952 workers, are employed in plants with changing product market competi-
tion, thereby enabling us to rest identification on within-plant variation in competition.
Notably, the number of transitions is not only reasonably large but is also roughly sym-
metrical with increases in competitive pressure being of similar magnitude as decreases.
This renders it unlikely that plants with changing product market competition are a se-
lective sample6.
Table 2 Descriptive statistics
Women Men
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Potential experience (years) 22.0 11.5 23.8 10.2
Tenure (years) 10.7 8.6 13.2 9.3
Tenure censored (dummy) 0.023 0.151 0.031 0.173
Apprenticeship, no Abitur (dummy) 0.600 0.490 0.674 0.469
No apprenticeship, Abitur (dummy) 0.021 0.142 0.010 0.102
Apprenticeship, Abitur (dummy) 0.100 0.300 0.044 0.206
Technical college degree (dummy) 0.040 0.195 0.070 0.255
University degree (dummy) 0.071 0.257 0.086 0.280
Non-German nationality (dummy) 0.069 0.254 0.074 0.261
Share of female workers 0.399 0.239 0.211 0.159
Share of lowly qualified workers 0.231 0.247 0.192 0.223
Works council (dummy) 0.813 0.390 0.885 0.319
Collective bargaining at firm level (dummy) 0.148 0.355 0.165 0.371
Collective bargaining at sector level (dummy) 0.645 0.478 0.704 0.457
Exporting activity (dummy) 0.607 0.488 0.767 0.423
New production technology (dummy) 0.837 0.370 0.840 0.366
Plant in rural area (dummy) 0.177 0.382 0.173 0.378
Plant size (number of workers) 5,420 11,967 8,610 15,100
Observations 305,876 1,239,911
Notes: LIAB cross-sectional model, West Germany, 2008–2010. Tenure is left-censored if the worker’s job with the plant
started before 1975.
Table 1 Wages by sex and product market competition
Women Men
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Full sample
Gross daily wages (in €) 104.36 45.90 132.41 50.47
Log gross daily wages 4.55 0.44 4.82 0.38
Strong product market competition (dummy) 0.61 0.49 0.66 0.47




Plants facing weak product market competition
Gross daily wages (in €) 99.00 43.86 126.10 48.77
Log gross daily wages 4.50 0.44 4.77 0.38
Codetermination-free plant (dummy) 0.14 0.35 0.09 0.29
Observations 120,176 424,971
Plants facing strong product market competition
Gross daily wages (in €) 107.83 46.84 135.70 51.02
Log gross daily wages 4.59 0.44 4.84 0.37
Codetermination-free plant (dummy) 0.07 0.25 0.04 0.20
Observations 185,700 814,940
Notes: LIAB cross-sectional model, West Germany, 2008–2010. Wages are deflated by the consumer price index. Strong
product market competition refers to the highest category on a four-point Likert scale of a plant-level self-assessment
of competition.
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Table 3 Transitions between strong and weak product market competition
Initial product market competition Product market competition in the next period
Plants Workers
Weak (t + 1) Strong (t + 1) Weak (t + 1) Strong (t + 1)
Weak (t) 2,751 842 180,034 88,965
Strong (t) 873 2,326 82,404 400,549
Notes: LIAB cross-sectional model, West Germany, 2008–2010. Strong product market competition refers to the highest
category on a four-point Likert scale of a plant-level self-assessment of competition.
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To test the hypothesis that product market competition lowers the gender pay gap, we
will run augmented Mincerian wage regressions. Our baseline specification is a fully
interacted model
lnwijt ¼ π1 f emi þ π2compjt þ π3compjt  f emi þ x
0
it αþ β f emið Þ þ z
0
jt γ þ δ  f emið Þ þ εijt ;
ð1Þ
where lnwijt is the log gross daily wage of worker i working for plant j in period t; femi
is a female dummy, and compjt is a dummy indicating strong product market competition.
compjt × femi is the interaction of these two, and π1, π2, and π3 are the corresponding
coefficients. Furthermore, xit denotes a vector of worker characteristics, zjt a vector of
plant characteristics, εijt the idiosyncratic error component, and α, β, γ, and δ are the corre-
sponding coefficient vectors. In using a fully interacted model, we allow each worker
and plant characteristic to affect men’s and women’s wages differently and thus exploit
a more flexible framework than the earlier contributions by Belfield and Heywood
(2006) and Hirsch et al. (2012), which also utilise plant-level measures of product market
competition.
Worker controls comprise potential experience and tenure (both linearly and squared),
dummy variables for joining the plant before 1975 (i.e. censored job tenure), five levels of
education, non-German nationality, year of observation, and three-digit occupation. Plant
controls include log plant size and its square, the shares of female and low-skilled workers
in the plant’s workforce, dummies for works council existence, a collective agreement at
either firm level or sector level, exporting activity, new production technology, plant loca-
tion in a rural area, and one-digit industry.
To ease interpretation, all regressors are centred around their sample averages, so
that π1 can be interpreted as the average unexplained gender pay gap in the full sample.
The coefficients of main interest are π2 and π3, where π2 gives the effect of strong
product market competition on males’ wages, and π3 is the difference in the competition
effect across the sexes. We expect strong competition to depress the overall rents
accruing and thus workers’ wages in general. Moreover, strong competition should also
confine employers’ ability to discriminate against women by sharing rents dispropor-
tionately with male workers (cf. Black and Strahan 2001). Hence, we expect π2 to have a
negative sign and π3 to have a positive sign, the latter indicating that strong competi-
tion reduces the gender pay gap by inducing a smaller adverse effect on females’
compared to males’ wages.
In this baseline specification, identification rests on both inter-plant and within-plant
variation in competition. It is therefore unclear whether the results are driven by
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genuine competition effect. To come closer to the true competition effect, we next add
plant–sex fixed effects to the model, i.e., we control for permanent differences in plants’
sex-specific wage policies. As discussed in Section 2, this is viable in our data because
we have a sufficient number of plants with varying product market competition over
time. Our second specification thus is
lnwijt ¼ π2compjt þ π3compjt  f emi þ x
0
it βþ γ  f emið Þ þ z
0
jt αþ δ  f emið Þ þ vj þ ζ j  f emi þ εijt;
ð2Þ
where the plant fixed effect for men and women is vj and vj + ζj, respectively
7. In this
second specification, identification of π2 and π3 relies on within-plant variation in com-
petition and the accompanying changes in male and female workers’ wages. Hence, π2
tells us how males’ wages and π3 how the unexplained gender pay gap responds to in-
tensified competition.
That said, changes in workers’ wages due to varying competition may stem from two
different sources: Either varying competition triggers wage changes for on-going jobs,
i.e., for given worker–plant pairs, or wages change due to altering worker composition.
And workers with different unobserved characteristics, like motivation, career outlook,
or mobility, may self-select themselves into plants with different competitive pressure.
As women and men have been found to differ considerably in both career aspirations
and job mobility (e.g., Chevalier 2007 and Hirsch and Schnabel 2012), self-selection of
workers may contaminate within-plant comparisons of unexplained gender pay gaps. In
order to address self-selection of workers, we next include match fixed effects to our
model, i.e., we control for the permanent wage component of every worker–plant pair.
Hence, our third specification is given by
lnwijt ¼ π2compjt þ π3compjt  f emi þ x
0
it βþ γ  f emið Þ þ z
0
jt αþ δ  f emið Þ þ ϕij þ εijt
ð3Þ
with match fixed effect ϕij. In this final specification, identification of π2 and π3 restssolely on changes in workers’ within-plant wage growth, which is occurring simultaneously
with within-plant variation in competition, i.e., wage changes within a given worker–plant
pair. Estimated competition effects are thus free from biases stemming from unobserved
heterogeneity in plants’ permanent sex-specific wage policies and self-selection of
workers with different unobserved time-invariant characteristics. A fall in workers’
within-plant real wage growth may stem from various channels, such as decreased
bonus payments, below-inflation nominal wage increases, or a reduction in the wage
cushion between contract wages and effective wages.
We should make clear, though, that both specifications (2) and (3) just identify short-
run effects of product market competition on workers’ wages, i.e., changes in wages
occurring simultaneously with within-plant variation in competition. However, long-run
effects, which we cannot identify given the short time horizon of our data, may be lar-
ger as it may take some time for employers to alter wages. Furthermore, plants’ discre-
tion to adjust wages in the short run is likely to differ depending on their industrial
relations regime. Arguably, plants bound by legally binding collective agreements may
find it harder to cut wages in response to intensified competitive pressure. In a similar
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reduce wages in such an event8. We thus expect to find marked competition effects
only in plants belonging to the codetermination-free sector.4 Results
Running the three wage regressions (1)–(3) on our full sample yields the results sum-
marised in Table 4. In the OLS specification, we find a highly significant average unex-
plained gender pay gap of 14.6 log points, which is similar in magnitude to previous
studies for West Germany, such as Gartner and Hinz (2009) and Hirsch (2013). As can
be seen from the estimated coefficient of the competition dummy, male workers’ wages
are 1.1 log points lower in plants facing strong product market competition, which is
statistically insignificant at conventional levels. The interaction effect of the female and
the competition dummy indicates that the competition effect is almost zero and statis-
tically insignificant. Note that the estimated coefficients of other regressors (which we
do not report in Table 4 for the sake of brevity) show no surprises and are in line with
the previous literature.
The picture hardly changes when resting identification on within-plant variation in
competition in specifications (2) and (3). Intensified competition lowers male workers’
wages by 0.8 (0.9) log points in the specification with plant–sex (match) fixed effects,
where the coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 (10) per cent level. Yet, the inter-
action effect of the female and the competition dummy is still very small and statis-
tically insignificant throughout. So in the full sample, there is no indication of a
differential short-run effect of intensified product market competition on female and
male workers’ wages and thus no evidence of a (levelling) competition effect on gender
wage discrimination.
However, as discussed in Section 3, short-run effects are expected to be only visible in
plants that possess enough discretion to adjust wages in the short run. We therefore think
that effects are more likely to be visible in plants not subject to worker codetermination.
To check this, we split our sample in two subsamples: plants bound by a collectiveTable 4 Wage regressions (full sample)
(1) (2) (3)
OLS Plant–sex fixed effects Match fixed effects
Strong product market competition −0.0112 −0.0082** −0.0094*
(0.0068) (0.0041) (0.0049)





Notes: LIAB cross-sectional model, West Germany, 2008–2010. The regressand is the log gross daily wage. Standard errors
in parentheses are clustered at the plant level. ***/**/* denotes statistical significance at the 1/5/10 per cent level. In
Model 1, additional regressors are potential experience and tenure (linearly and squared), dummy variables for joining a
plant before 1975, five levels of education, non-German nationality, the shares of female and low-skilled workers in the
plant’s workforce, log plant size and its square, dummies for works council existence, a collective agreement at either
firm level or sector level, exporting activity, new production technology, plant location in a rural area, one-digit industry,
three-digit occupation, and year of observation. Model 2 additionally includes plant–sex fixed effects, whereas Model 3
includes match fixed effects. All regressors are centred around their sample averages and also interacted with the
female dummy.
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running wage regressions on both subsamples are summarised in Table 5.
In line with earlier contributions, like Jirjahn and Stephan (2006) or Heinze and Wolf
(2010), the unexplained gender pay gap is lower if some sort of worker codetermination
is present. In the OLS specification (1), the gap amounts to 22.3 log points in
codetermination-free plants but just 14.7 log points in plants with worker codetermina-
tion. As expected, in codetermined plants workers’ wages do not respond much to in-
tensified competition. In the specifications with plant–sex or match fixed effects, an
increase in competition causes male workers’ wages to fall by 0.7–0.8 log points, where
the effect is statistically insignificant in the specification including match fixed effects.
Furthermore, as the interaction effect is almost zero, there is clearly no differential ef-
fect across the sexes.
Results are different for the codetermination-free sector in which workers’ wages are
responding to intensified competition. This is in line with an earlier finding by Belfield
and Heywood (2006) for the U.K. that the cross-sectional link between competition
and the gap is driven by the non-unionised sector. Depending on specification, males’
wages decrease by 1.5–3.2 log points if competition gets fierce, where all effects are sta-
tistically significant at least at the 5 per cent level. As the interaction effect indicates
that women’s wages are considerably less depressed than men’s, the unexplained gender
pay gap is significantly reduced by 1.2–2.1 log points. In our preferred specification in-
cluding match fixed effects and thus addressing unobserved plant heterogeneity and
worker self-selection, intensified product market competition reduces males’ wages by
1.9 log points 9, while females’ wages are almost unaffected as the interaction effect also
accounts to 1.8 log points10. This is in line with our expectation that intensified competi-
tive pressure reduces the rents accruing and thus restricts employers’ ability to share rentsTable 5 Wage regressions by worker codetermination
(1) (2) (3)
OLS Plant–sex fixed effects Match fixed effects
Plants with some worker codetermination
Strong product market competition −0.0092 −0.0073* −0.0077
(0.0072) (0.0043) (0.0049)






Strong product market competition −0.0320*** −0.0152** −0.0187**
(0.0111) (0.0075) (0.0087)





Notes: LIAB cross-sectional model, West Germany, 2008–2010. The regressand is the log gross daily wage. Standard errors
in parentheses are clustered at the plant level. ***/**/* denotes statistical significance at the 1/5/10 per cent level.
Regressors are those listed in Table 4.
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by 1.8 log points if competition gets fierce. As the average gap in codetermination-free
plants accounts to 22.3 log points, this means that it drops by about 8 per cent. Since this
fall in the gap represents a short-run effect, and the long-run effect is arguably larger, we
regard the competition effect on the gender pay gap as non-trivial from an economic
point of view11.
To further scrutinise our results, we next split our sample by the share of females in
plants’ workforces. In Becker’s (1971) model with taste-based employer discrimination,
plants employing fewer women are not only more discriminatory employers but also
less profitable. Therefore, we may expect the competition effect on the gender pay gap
to be more pronounced in plants with a below-average share of female workers, which
should be hit disproportionately by intensified product market competition.
To be precise, this notion is not literally true in Becker’s (1971) original model where
the gender pay gap is the same for all women, no matter whether they work for dis-
criminatory or non-discriminatory employers. However, this latter conclusion of the
model hinges on the assumption that workers can instantaneously and costlessly switch
employers. Once one builds in some forces restricting worker mobility, it does not hold
anymore. For instance, Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) incorporate discriminatory em-
ployer preferences into Mortensen’s (1990) equilibrium search model with on-the-job
search. They show that employers with more pronounced discriminatory preferences
offer lower wages to women than employers with less pronounced tastes for dis-
crimination and also end up with lower profits. Since intensified competition puts
additional pressure on firm profitability, it restricts discriminatory employers’ ability
to pay for discrimination, and it does more so for more discriminatory employers
who already make lower profits than their competitors. Hence, we expect the un-
explained gender pay gap to fall to a larger extent in plants with a lower share of
females in their workforces12.
To check whether the effect of competition on the unexplained gender pay gap is
more pronounced in plants employing fewer women, we run wage regressions separ-
ately for workers employed by plants with below-average and plants with above-average
shares of female workers (in the respective two-digit industry)13. Table 6 presents the
estimated competition effects from our preferred specification with match fixed effects.Table 6 Wage regressions with match fixed effects by worker codetermination and the
share of females in plants’ workforces
Effect of intensified product market competition on the
unexplained gender pay gap




All plants 0.0016 −0.0006 0.0176**
(0.0039) (0.0037) (0.0080)
Plants with below-average share of females 0.0045 0.0028 0.0196**
(0.0042) (0.0041) (0.0077)
Plants with above-average share of females 0.0008 0.0001 −0.0026
(0.0033) (0.0036) (0.0061)
Notes: LIAB cross-sectional model, West Germany, 2008–2010. The regressand is the log gross daily wage. The coefficient
shown is the interaction effect of the competition and the female dummy. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered
at the plant level. ***/**/* denotes statistical significance at the 1/5/10 per cent level. Regressors are those listed
in Table 4.
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competition lowers the gender pay gap by 0.5 log points in plants with a below-average
female share, which is not statistically significant. This levelling effect of product mar-
ket competition is somewhat smaller (0.3 log points) in plants with some worker code-
termination and much larger (2.0 log points) and statistically significant at the 5 per
cent level in codetermination-free plants. Remarkably, competition has no effect on the
gender pay gap in plants with an above-average female share. Since, according to the-
ory, plants with a below-average female share are more discriminatory employers, these
findings are suggestive that intensified product market competition indeed reduces gen-
der discrimination stemming from employer prejudices against women.
5 Conclusions
Using linked employer–employee panel data for West Germany for the years 2008–
2010 that include a plant-level self-assessment on product market competition, we have
investigated the effect of competition on the gender pay gap. In our preferred specifica-
tion, we control for match fixed effects, thereby resting identification on the differential
impact of within-plant variation in competitive pressure on within-plant wage growth
of men and women. We thus address both unobserved time-invariant plant heterogen-
eity and worker self-selection into plants facing different levels of competition.
In line with Becker’s (1971) model of taste-based employer discrimination where
competition limits employers’ ability to discriminate against women, we find that inten-
sified competition significantly lowers the unexplained gender pay gap in plants without
any worker codetermination by 1.8 percentage points. On the other hand, there is no
levelling effect of competition in plants bound by collective agreements and/or that
have a works council. There are three explanations for this latter finding that seem to be
consistent with our evidence: First, institutions of codetermination may yield sluggish
wage reactions, and longer-term estimates might show a response that mimics those
without codetermination. Second, institutions of codetermination may resist any rent
reduction (even if rents largely accrue to male workers). And third, institutions of
codetermination may reduce the gender pay gap sufficiently on their own such that there
is no added reduction associated with product market competition. While we do not
have a strong preference for any of these explanations, we are also not aware of a
convincing way how to discriminate among these in our data.
We also document that there is a more pronounced competition effect on the gender
pay gap in plants with a below-average share of females in their workforces and that
such an effect is generally absent in plants with an above-average female share. Since,
according to theory, employers employing fewer women are more discriminatory, these
findings are suggestive that competition indeed restricts gender wage discrimination,
thus, reeling in employer prejudices against women.
Although we were able to improve on earlier contributions, particularly in terms of
identification, the brief time horizon of our panel data only permited us to identify
the short-run effect of product market competition on gender wage discrimination.
While this short-run effect turned out to be non-trivial in magnitude, the long-run ef-
fect is likely to be larger, and we therefore regard our estimates as a lower bound of the
competition effect. Investigating the long-run effect of product market competition on
the gender pay gap seems to be a promising avenue for future research.
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1Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2005) provide a large meta-analysis of more
than 260 international studies on the gender pay gap between the 1960s and the 1990s.
2In our sample, 4.3 per cent of plants report “no pressure from competition at
all”, 11.1 per cent “minor pressure from competition”, 38.5 per cent “medium pres-
sure from competition”, and 46.1 per cent “substantial pressure from competition”,
where we take the latter category as an indicator of strong competition in the plant’s
product market.
3Note that we do not find any impact of product market competition on both men’s
and women’s wages when repeating our analysis for East Germany, which is in line with
our earlier cross-sectional findings reported in Hirsch et al. (2012).
4As a check of robustness, we also redid our analysis excluding observations with
top-coded wages from the sample, which did not change our insights.
5A multivariate analysis of the incidence of strong product market competition shows
that plants facing strong competitive pressures are, ceteris paribus, larger, more often
covered by collective agreements, and concentrated in (male-dominated) industries like
manufacturing and construction. Hence, the descriptive evidence in Table 1 is likely to
be driven by plant size, industry, and union effects.
6In addition to Table 3, Table 7 presents a detailed transition matrix for plants’ self-
assessed pressure from product market competition across the whole four-point Likert
scale. It shows that less than 1 per cent of plants change from the highest to the lowest
category or vice versa, while 95 per cent of transitions are between neighbouring cat-
egories, thereby mitigating concerns that changes in plants’ self-assessed product mar-
ket competition reflect inconsistent reporting. Moreover, excluding the few plants with
extreme changes in product market competition in a check of robustness did not
change our estimation results.
7Note that the coefficient of the female dummy π1 is no longer identified when add-
ing plant–sex or match fixed effects.
8Strictly speaking, German labour law precludes works councils from directly negoti-
ating wages (which is the task assigned to trade unions). Yet, the extensive veto powers
enjoyed by works councils in non-wage areas give them sufficient bargaining leverage
to pressure management not to cut wages (cf. Addison et al. 2001).
9Note that male workers’ wages drop somewhat less in the specification with plant–
sex fixed effects, suggesting that specification (2) misses part of the competition effect
due to workers self-selecting into plants where accruing rents are large.
10Testing the effect of competition on females’ wages, we also find that it is statisti-
cally insignificant in all three specifications (with p-values ranging from 0.38 to 0.78).Table 7 Plant transitions between different levels of product market competition
Initial pressure from product
market competition
Pressure from product market competition in the next period
No (t + 1) Minor (t + 1) Medium (t + 1) Substantial (t + 1)
No (t) 103 84 56 28
Minor (t) 49 275 292 92
Medium (t) 37 301 1,554 722
Substantial (t) 37 94 742 2,326
Notes: LIAB cross-sectional model, West Germany, 2008–2010.
Hirsch et al. IZA Journal of Labor Economics  (2014) 3:19 Page 13 of 1411We also experimented with different definitions of strong product market competi-
tion. In particular, we defined strong competition comprising the two highest categories
(rather than the single highest category) of plants’ self-assessment of competition. Using
this definition, 84.6 per cent of plants report strong product market competition, and
only few changes between weak and strong product market competition take place
(see Table 7). Redoing our analysis with this alternative indicator of strong product
market competition, we find a similar sex difference in the impact of product market
competition on workers’ wages in codetermined and codetermination-free plants
using the OLS specification, though this interaction effect is generally statistically
insignificant as estimates are considerably less precise. Furthermore, estimates of
specifications with either plant–sex or match fixed effects turned out to be too noisy
to draw any conclusions, which is not that surprising given the few changes between
strong and weak competition in this alternative definition of strong product market
competition.
12We are aware that a low share of females in plants’ workforce may not only reflect
employers’ taste for discrimination but may also mirror that limited product market
competition actually enables them to engage in costly discrimination against women.
13Note that we classify plants based on their time-average of the female share. Hence,
we rule out that plants switch between groups, in particular due to changes in product
market competition reflected in their workforce composition (see endnote 12).
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